7 The rise and fall of the inter-paradigm debate

Ole Wæver

> The separation of concepts applicable to groups from those applicable to individuals is a powerful tool for eliminating the solipsism characteristic of traditional methodologies. Science becomes intrinsically a group activity, no longer even idealizable as a one-person game.
>
> Thomas S. Kuhn (1993, p. xiii)

A standard textbook presentation of International Relations (IR) has it that there are three paradigms, three dominant schools. The first is realism, the second is alternately called pluralism, interdependence and world society but it is in some sense always the liberal approach, and the third is Marxism or more broadly radicalism, structuralism or globalism. Some writers claim that this is the timeless pattern of International Relations debate – even in the classics, we find these three types of thinking (Kauppi and Viotti, 1992; Viotti and Kauppi 1993 [1987]). Others will be more restrictive and say the discipline *became* like this at some point, e.g. in the 1970s (Holsti, 1985). Not everyone, however, cherishes this categorisation.

Is it vague and arbitrary? (Why these three? Why three? Where do you place the Neo-realism/Neo-liberalism debate?) No, all typologies are problematic – this no more than others. Such will not be my main line of criticism. A fairly coherent construction can be made (and will be presented in section 1).

But 'the debate' is a misleading map and a bad guide to introduce students to. This is not the pattern of debate today. The story about an 'inter-paradigm debate' does not give a grip on the ongoing controversies in the discipline. The debate has moved on; self-referential story-telling in the discipline ought to move with it. We need to construct new, more up-to-date stories and invent new images and metaphors to replace the triangle of the late 1970s. (Sections 2, 3 and 4 will address the peculiarities of this picture in contrast to alternative, contemporary maps.)

Is the debate's self-conception of the *status* of the debate a useful tool for self-appreciation of IR? No, the image of 'incommensurable'

paradigms is a block to scientific progress as well as to earnest, painful criticism, and its 'theory of science' basis is at least contestable (see the final section in this chapter).

What was the inter-paradigm debate?

The first great debate in IR was that of idealism versus realism in the 1940s and the second was behaviouralism versus traditionalism in the 1950s–1960s. In the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, there was increasing criticism of the dominant realist paradigm, not primarily its methodology, but its image of the world, its alleged state-centrism, preoccupation with power and its blindness to various kinds of processes domestically, transnationally and beyond the political–military sphere.

The challengers not only formulated a criticism of realism but tried to present alternative conceptions of the international system. These went in terms of regional integration, transnationalism, interdependence, and a pluralist system of numerous sub-state and trans-state actors who made up a much more complicated image than the usual state-to-state one. States did not exist as such – various actors in the state interacted to produce what looked like state policy and sometimes even went around it and had their own linkages across borders. Not only were there more actors than the state, the state was not the state but was to be decomposed into networks of bureaucracies, interest groups and individuals in a pluralist perspective.

Increasingly, it became clear that the new theories were to win no easy victory. The realist imagery had a solid hold on decision makers who kept to some extent operating in a world of states (Rothstein 1972), and the new formulations had difficulty consolidating into *theory* and not just complications *of* the realist theory.[1]

There was a general understanding, that an alternative image of international politics had materialised, but also that realism did not easily give in. The two paradigms had different strengths, there were things better explained by the one, and others better dealt with by the other. And more importantly: there was no way to *prove* one or the other right. Realists and pluralists (interdependence people) *saw* different realities. If they went out to 'test' their theories, they would test them against different material, for they each sorted the world according to different concepts and thus got different empirical material. This was not the conception of for instance Keohane and Nye, who actually tried to test the two models – and the ensuing four models of regime change – against each other. But the emerging self-perception in and of the



Figure 7.1 The inter-paradigm debate

discipline was that competing theories had emerged which each contained its own confirming stories, data and preferred issues.

Such an understanding was assisted by the contemporary criticism of positivism and especially Thomas Kuhn's theory of *paradigms*.[2] From here the idea was borrowed, that relations among competing general theories cannot be judged in any over-arching, neutral language. Each 'paradigm' constructs its own basic concepts/units and questions – and thereby its data, criteria and not least its stories about paradigmatic experiments or similar scientific events. Paradigms are incommensurable, because they each generate their criteria of judgement and their own 'language'. Realism and its pluralist challenger appeared to be such incommensurable paradigms.[3]

Meanwhile, a third paradigm had arisen: Marxism. Marxism was not new as a theory making powerful statements on international relations. Actually, it had done so at least as long as the discipline of IR had existed. (The first department of IR was – as all readers of this book have realised by now – established in Aberystwyth in 1919; Lenin wrote his *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* in 1916.) Theories of imperialism had been discussed vigorously – probably more blood was spilled here than in the debates of IR. But very few saw this as international relations (despite the dual allegiances of one of the founding fathers, Carr). In the 1970s, however, Marxism was increasingly seen as an alternative theory of international relations. It was not really equally well established within IR, but it became fashionable to present the discipline as engaged in a triangular debate (Marcusian 'repressive tolerance'?). Maybe it was triangular, but it was *de facto* mainly a debate along one side of the triangle (Figure 7.1).

It is easy to see that the three schools tell different stories of international relations. Numerous 3 times x schemes have been filled out with: key actor, concept of system, main sector, etc. (some of this is condensed in Table 7.1, but will not be rehearsed here). One might

more interestingly ask: what are the essential features of the three schools?

One way to answer could be with Rosenau to emphasise the key level of analysis: the state-as-actor for realism, the many non-state (e.g. firms), sub-state (e.g. bureaucracies), supra-state (e.g. regimes) and trans-state (e.g. transnational bureaucracies) actors for liberalism, and finally the system for the neo-Marxists. It was this logic that led many in Britain to use the term 'pluralism' for the liberal strand and 'structuralism' for the Marxists. Pluralism because of the many actors and the link to liberal, political science,[4] and 'structuralism', because the whole system is much more organised and ordered according to the Marxists, than according to the other two. Following Rosenau, the system is fragmented to the realists, interdependent to the pluralist and integrated according to Marxists. (This was before attention was focused on *structural* realism, or neo-realism, whereafter 'structuralism' became more difficult as a code word for Marxism.)

One could also emphasise a difference regarding state/non-state and political/non-political. The realist's focus (in this story) on the states and their conception is political – relations from other spheres do not impinge deeply. The liberalists basically believe that all the interaction in other fields will eventually have an effect on international relations. The general evolution that has marked human affairs will also change the international. It is impossible that this sphere will remain the same (as claimed by the realists) while all other spheres change so dramatically. 'Non-political' relations will eventually transform this political set-up of states and conflict. The Marxists have a political, conflictual approach. There are conflicts of interest. But they do not operate between states, but within states and across states between oppressors and oppressed. By this formulation it becomes clear that this is not a continuum with two extremes and an in-between position (as the Wightian three traditions in some sense is). The two can line up against the third in all possible constellations depending on what is emphasised. Realists and radicals agree in recognising the role of power and struggle in contrast to the more harmony-oriented liberalism. Radicals and liberals together attack the narrow state universe of the realists. And of course the radicals on many issues meet a common front of realists and liberals who reject revolutionary change. You can keep travelling around in the triangle – it does not stabilise into a simple dichotomy.

Also it is clear, that the concept of time differs among the three: realism claims that fundamental change does not appear in international relations. The liberals find it hard to believe that in an era marked by accelerated change of almost everything else, international relations

Table 7.1 *Boxing the inter-paradigm debate*

	Realism	Pluralism/ interdependence	Marxism/radicalism
Level according to Rosenau	state-centric	multi-centric	global-centric
Basic actors	states	numerous sub-state, trans-state and non-state actors	the capitalist world economy (or forces and relations of production) and classes
Image (Banks)	billiard ball model	cobweb model	octopus model
View of the state	unitary actor	disaggregated into components	representing class interests (more or less directly)
Behavioural dynamic (Viotti and Kauppi)	State is rational actor seeking to maximise its own interest or national objectives in foreign policy	Foreign policy making and trans-national processes involve conflict, bargaining, coalition, and compromise – not necessarily resulting in optimal outcomes	Focus is on patterns of dominance within and among societies
Issues	National security is top	Multiple, not least welfare	Economic factors
Solidity of reality (objective/ subjective)	National interests exist objectively. The statesman has to ascertain these and to act them out. In some versions, the world of manipulation and intuition take on an independent life	Perceptions and roles often differ from reality. Academic analysis can help to find rational and optimal policy	Deep structures in the economy are very stable and consistent. Political actors are systematically misguided in their perceptions (ideology).
Repetition/ change	timeless laws, international relations is the realm of recurrence	change and possibly progress	stable and continuous pattern – until the break
conflict/ co-operation	relations among states are basically conflictual/ competitive	relations among states are potentially co-operative, non-state actors often mitigate conflict, but make the image confusing	Relations within and among states are conflictual, because the class struggle is the main pattern
Time	Static	Evolutionary	Revolutionary

Sources: Rosenau, 1982; Viotti and Kauppi, 1987; Keohane and Nye, 1977; Wilde, 1989.

should remain insulated from evolution/progress. And the radicals believe that everything could be different if just everything was different, i.e. there has to be one basic, revolutionary change, and then we can talk improvement. For Marxists this is of course a revolution in the relations of production, but to other versions of radicalism it is more often the states-system that has to be abolished.

As to terminology, there is agreement on the first corner: *realism* (except in the International Political Economy formulation of Gilpin where this is called *mercantilism* or *nationalism*). The second is called *pluralism* (e.g. Banks, 1985; Little *et al.*, 1981; Viotti and Kauppi, 1993 [1987]) to underline the multiple units disaggregation of the state and its affinity to non-statist approaches in political science, *liberalism* (which I will take as the most enduring label which links up to inter-war perspectives and which has returned in recent years as the preferred label in the US; cf. also McKinlay and Little, 1986), *globalism* (in for instance Maghrori and Ramberg, 1982) and *world society* (Groom, 1988; Rittberger and Wolf, 1988). The term *globalism* is used by some as designation for the third perspective as it points to the global, capitalist, world economy (cf. Viotti and Kauppi), but others prefer the term *structuralism* which stresses that the system is neither anarchic, nor equal, but structured in relations of super- and sub-ordination and actually quite 'organised' (e.g. Little *et al.* 1980; Banks, 1980). A more straightforward name would of course be *Marxism* (or neo-Marxism), but this corner contained also non-Marxist perspectives that were structuralist, dialectical and/or radical. One possibility is to use a label wide enough to capture all these 1970s–80s writings as well as 1980s post-modernism and critical theory which speaking in terms of 'discipline patterns' take the same location *vis-à-vis* the other positions. This might legitimise a rather vague covering term like *radicalism* for the third corner. James Rosenau rather precisely captured the late 1970s debate with the terms *state-centric*, *multi-centric* and *global-centric* (Rosenau, 1982). Alker and Biersteker in probably the most comprehensive overview used a 3 times 3 matrix where the three political perspectives (conservative, liberal-internationalist and radical/Marxist) were combined with three methodological approaches: traditional, behavioural and dialectical (1984). Numerous variations exist with authors adding a fourth or fifth, subdividing one or another of the basic paradigms, etc.[5] The image of the triangle, however, has been the one to be used most often as a guiding metaphor for the discipline. The term 'inter-paradigm debate' arouses in most scholars the image of three competing paradigms, and more important than the number is the form and content of debate, the meeting of incommensurable paradigms.

How did it differ from the other three great debates?

The debate took place mainly in the 1970s but gained its self-reflection *as* 'the inter-paradigm debate' or 'the third debate' in the beginning of the 1980s (Holsti, Rosenau, Banks).[6]

In contrast to the two previous debates, it increasingly was seen as a debate not to be won, but a pluralism to live with. In the first two debates, it was expected that one side would eventually win and International Relations would evolve as a coherent discipline in the winning camp. In the third debate, one increasingly (mostly implicitly) got the self-conception that the discipline *was* the debate. 'International Relations' was this disagreement, not a truth held by one of the positions. Each saw a side of reality that was important but could only be told from its perspective, not translated into the other two, nor subsumed in some grand synthesis. The discipline was thus in some sense richer for having all three voices, but also potentially in danger of fragmenting.

The yellow jersey of the leader who was in a position to define the discipline has travelled a complicated route. The discipline was invented in the inter-war period by liberalist theoreticians, while the first debate carried over the jersey to the camp of the realists (where now also they wanted to develop a specific discipline, International Relations). Realism had its palmy days in the 1940s and 1950s, and in a sense one might say the discipline did too. There was a clear focus, a relatively widespread consensus both on what IR was and that one had relevant things to say hereabout. Then followed the second debate, where the challengers were even more sure that the study of international relations was worthwhile and could be put to use (but possibly at times more doubtful whether there was a separate discipline). The movement of the new techniques hardly established a fixed, successful programme, and produced instead a confused situation. An assortment of empirical studies came from this wing, but no new paradigm. (Instead the behaviouralist challenge had a long-term impact on realism; more on this in a moment.) The behaviouralist programme with its fixation on method was not ready to *replace* realism (this the empirical findings were supposed to do!). The crux of the discipline came – if we stay with the metaphor of the yellow jersey – to hang fluttering somewhere near realism but in strong wind from the methodological challenge. After a period of extensive but diffuse belief in the new scientificness of the discipline, we returned to realism but a less focused, less self-assured realism. IR research could be conducted in a multitude of ways, many of which were on arch-realist premises (e.g. with power political, egoistic states fitted into models of a game theoretical or system theoretical nature). Thus the discipline

flapped towards the 1970s when it definitely became triangular. With incommensurability, one no longer strived for ending debate, for finding who was right, but acknowledged that each 'paradigm' contained its own truth, and that they were all valuable. The debate is the discipline. This was definitely different from the two previous debates (as well as the one to follow it).

The debates have also differed as to arena or object of contest. The arena for competition in the inter-paradigm debate was largely 'basic assumptions' and 'basic images': what is international relations made up of – states, individuals, bureaucracies, a global economy, or what? Each paradigm was assumed to be locked, psychologically in its self-reaffirming conception which it could not convince the other of. The main issue of contention was 'the nature of international relations' (with ensuing political consequences) and the secondary one 'methodology'.

The fourth debate will be introduced in greater detail in section 4, but a brief way of presenting the distinction between the third and fourth debate could be via Lapid's article on 'The Third Debate' (1989). Yosef Lapid has given a summarising (and widely accepted) interpretation of the meta-theoretical debates of the 1980s as the third debate of the discipline. 'The third debate' has according to Lapid stimulated self-reflection in IR and by use of closer connections to meta-theoretical debates elsewhere in the social sciences furthered a revolt against positivist left-overs, and thereby pointed towards new measures for objectivity and science in IR. Beyond the detail that (unless this is assimilated into the inter-paradigm debate, or the latter is ignored) we must have reached the *fourth* debate, I see his attempt as problematic in content. In the Lapid version, the debate of post-structuralists (and others) with rationalists is turned into a question of epistemology (how do we know?) and something close to the second debate (on a higher level). This is too superficial in relation to the truly *philosophical* nature of the fourth debate. It is in contrast to the third debate not primarily about the character of the international system and contrary to the second debate it concerns more than how researchers could and should work. In some ways it is closer to the first in being about the relationship between 'reality' and 'utopia', about activist interventions versus a search for knowledge, about the relationship between language, politics and praxis. But first of all it is a much more fundamental challenge of basic assumptions regarding objectivity, subjectivity (the author, signature and the work), object/subject distinctions, the use of dichotomies, the rule by Western metaphysics over seemingly diverse ways of thought, and about referential versus relational conceptions of language, and much,

Table 7.2 *Themes of the four debates*

	Politics	Philosophy	Epistemology	Ontology (The nature of IR)	Methodology
first debate	XXX	XX		X	
second debate			XX	X	XXX
third debate	XX			XXX	X
fourth debate		XXX	XX	X	

Note: XXX = main form of debate. XX = secondary form, etc.

much more. If one accepts the challenge of the post-structuralists, this has consequences not only for the 'method' one uses (second debate), nor 'just' for one's perception of what international relations basically consists of (third debate), but it has consequences for how one perceives basic articles in the world we live in: language, society, praxis, politics, individuals and such like (see Table 7.2).

Politics was discussed in the first debate as balance of power versus rule of law and international organisations, and in the third as a debate over *détente* versus power politics, multilateral co-operation versus national policy. *Philosophy* was discussed, e.g. by Carr in the 1930s and 1940s, as utopia versus realism, and morality versus relativism, and again in the 1980s as questions of morality, relativism and activist theorising, of subject/object dichotomies and 'the death of the author'. *Epistemology* played a certain role in the second and the fourth debate; and *method* was at the centre of the second, whereas the third was basically about *the nature of IR (ontology)*, an issue that has always lurked in the background of all the debates.[7]

Thus, Table 7.2 should indicate that the fourth debate raises philosophical questions not reducible to those of the third. This is why one of the criticisms raised against Lapid was that he 'had lost sight of the critical purpose for which methodological pluralism and relativism have been pushed . . . It is not pluralism without purpose, but a *critical* pluralism, designed to reveal embedded power and authority structures, provoke critical scrutiny of dominant discourses, empower marginalized populations and perspectives, and provide a basis for alternative conceptualizations' (Biersteker, 1989, p. 264).

The third debate can be clearly singled out from the other three debates in three ways: its self-conception as 'incommensurable paradigms'; its area for locating the differences: 'ontologically' as different conceptions of the nature, units and content of international relations; and its 'participants': the three schools.

How did it start?

The specific parties to the inter-paradigm debate should not be explained here, they have their separate chapters in this book. What is important in this context is the *form* of the debate: incommensurability.[8] The paradigms could not have a real, normal 'debate'. They could not be tested against each other, since they basically did not speak the same language.

This at first had the 'liberating' function to allow weaker contenders to appear on the scene without being immediately bulldozed. It served a kind of 'infant industry' function and the reason for this pluralism was probably to be found in the weakened mainstream: American IR was marked by self-doubt after the Vietnam war, the student revolt and the oil shock. Without a sense of direction and a self-assured centre to control developments, without a voice of authenticity, there was suddenly room for more diversity in IR. In the longer run, however, the inter-paradigm debate might have had a conservative function. 'It became a welcomed barrier against any critique and a good legitimation for scientific routine. "Don't criticise me, we speak different languages"' (Guzzini, 1988, p. 13, 1992, p. 142).

Thus, the main explanation for this peculiar form for a discipline to take is to be found in a weakening of the centre (cf. Holsti, 1985, 1993). This can be explained by a combination of *discipline history* (the attacks on realism)[9] and *discipline external* developments (as mentioned: student revolt, Vietnam war, etc.). In this situation, the discipline avoided complete disintegration through the holding operation of the inter-paradigm debate. This was made possible by some inter-disciplinary (and some intra-disciplinary across-levels) borrowing. There is a clear meta-theoretical inspiration from the theory of science discussion around Popper, Kuhn, Feyerabend and Lakatos. To what extent this was misapprehended and misapplied will be addressed later – and is actually less interesting. Kuhn's theory was anyway not meant for the social sciences but mainly for the natural sciences. Thus, we are not really talking 'application' of a meta-theoretical, philosophical framework, but rather an inter-disciplinary borrowing which so often happens in science and which always means 'misunderstanding' but is often very fruitful (as when evolutionary ideas are applied beyond biology, complementarity beyond nuclear physics, Galileian physics by Hobbes, etc.). The metaphor of *paradigms* was useful for reconstructing a more decentralised but stabilised image of the discipline in a time of troubles.

I would further suggest that there was also a kind of sideways inspiration from within the discipline. Implicitly, one seemed to borrow

from the 'perceptions' studies that proliferated in the same period (notably Jarvis, 1970, 1976; Snyder and Diesing, 1977; Janis and Mann, 1977): we are all caught by our view of the world, and this structures our way of importing new information and evaluating it. Ideas of perceptions, images, and cognitive psychology which found in those years their way into the discipline, were (implicitly) applied to the discipline itself.

When rereading the debates from then, textbooks from then and now, as well as Kuhn, it is striking how many of the participants in the debate actually employ something closer to the cognitive model of inertia in perceptions rather than paradigms in anything resembling Kuhn's sense. 'The new debate [the third debate] consisted of confrontation between opposing perspectives of the most general kind, variously known as frameworks, perspectives or paradigms. These were all terms intended to convey a world view more basic than theory' (Banks, 1984, p. 15). 'A paradigm contains within it a fundamental view of the world, and its assumptions act as lenses through which that world is perceived. "Facts" rarely speak for themselves and make sense only when interpreted in the light of the basic assumptions of a paradigm' (Mansbach and Vasquez, 1981, p. 71). Formulations like these miss the sociology of science and history of science argument by Kuhn (who is admittedly ambiguous on this; Masterman 1970), that paradigms are intrinsic to the *social* functioning of a scientific community.

The *perceptions* argument can be run on a purely individual basis ('we are all caught in our world views'). Why the discipline then coheres into three rather coherent 'paradigms' becomes something of a mystery. This often leads to a completely unKuhnian intrusion of naive realism (in the philosophical sense) suggesting that these three erupt because reality (international relations) actually consists of these three 'dimensions'. Alternatively, it is – in an instrumental and utilitarian manner – suggested, that 'we need' such shared images in order to organise our world and communicate about it (e.g. Holsti, 1988 [1967], pp. 11–13). With the more sociological approach of Kuhn, the emphasis instead falls on the production of questions or puzzles that are sufficiently closely tied to theories to be scientific. It is not that without paradigms, we could each be very wise but our images would be too complex for political advice and for debate among scholars. Without paradigms, there would be no *scientific* questions (Kuhn, 1970b, p. 9).

Progress can only appear in science within paradigms. Only paradigms can produce measures for this, and more importantly paradigms produce the puzzles on which to work. Participants can only be brought to accept such a framework by a process similar to a conversion, not by a rational

argument – the argument would be one about what are the most important questions (questions framed in terms of concepts that mean different things in the different formulations). Only within a paradigm, there can be clear criteria for choosing competing explanations – among competing paradigms not, and therefore no logically definitive way of proving what paradigm is 'right'. This is the root of Kuhn's image of scientific 'evolution' as alternating periods of 'normal science' with agreement on a dominant paradigm, and 'revolutionary' periods with competing paradigms and/or paradigms crisis.

As the meaning of employing quasi-Kuhnian arguments increasingly became to explain and to some extent legitimise the simultaneous existence of several 'paradigms' without a way to settle their differences, the emphasis shifted from the sociological explanations (which were tied to an image of one dominant paradigm) to the more cognitive argumentation in Kuhn,[10] but fitted nicely into the literature emerging in the discipline at the time about 'perceptions' and 'images'. Quoting from the text that introduced the term 'the third debate': 'Although realists and globalists disagree on the essential character of the international system, they both accept one point: models do count. They agree that [quoting Keohane and Nye] "one's assumptions about world politics profoundly affect what one sees and how one constructs theories to explain events"' (Maghrori and Ramberg, 1982, p. 14). But note: when there is a debate, the most important question is in a sense always to ask 'what do the contestants agree on: how do they agree to frame the question over which they subsequently disagree? And here the agreement, Ray Maghrori claims, is that images of the world shape theories and theories shape images of the world. The inter-paradigm debate is the accord on seeing international relations theories as competing and incommensurable perceptional filters.

Some of the first applications of Kuhnian terminology to international relations were by optimistic pluralists who saw 'the decay of an old paradigm' (realism), looked for 'anomalies' which the old paradigm was unable to explain (which they easily found) and thought that the setting was ready for the arrival of *the* new paradigm which should according to Kuhnian logic then replace the old one (see e.g. Mansbach and Vasquez, 1981). Even Banks (1984) who coined the phrase 'inter-paradigm debate' ultimately presents the outcome as the victory for the world society paradigm (which will in the future develop its anomalies etc.). These authors are in fact closer to the classical Kuhnian presentation of the evolution of science in terms of one dominant paradigm followed by a revolutionary period and then replaced by normal science within another paradigm (which the pluralists employing this terminology,

however, cannot resist presenting as a 'better' paradigm, which Kuhn would not say).[11]

Kuhn's own image of *social* science is that here, one often finds several paradigms operating simultaneously (or earlier, when the concept of paradigm was reserved for 'normal science', several competing schools). In this way, the debate in the social sciences comes to resemble that which is in natural science abnormal: the constant, critical attempts to question the believed.

> [I]t is the tradition of claims, counterclaims, and debates over fundamentals which, except perhaps during the Middle Ages, have characterized philosophy and much of social science ever since. Already by the Hellenistic period mathematics, astronomy, statics and the geometric parts of optics had abandoned this mode of discourse in favour of puzzle solving. Other sciences, in increasing numbers, have undergone the same transition since. In a sense, to turn Sir Karl's view on its head, it is precisely the abandonment of critical discourse that marks the transition to a science. Once a field has made that transition, critical discourse recurs only at moments of crisis when the bases of the field are again in jeopardy. Only when they must choose between competing theories do scientists behave like philosophers. (Kuhn, 1970b, p. 7)

Kuhn himself has not much to say about more permanently 'multiple-paradigm sciences' (Masterman, 1970, p. 74). The most enduring contribution of the Kuhnian idea of paradigms to IR has been the image of a by definition inconclusive debate among competing schools of thought.

Did it exist, the inter-paradigm debate? Partly no, it was not actually an intense three-way debate occupying the minds of International Relationists, but an artificially constructed 'debate', mainly invented for specific presentational purposes, teaching and self-reflection of the discipline. (Just as the first and second debates to some extent were constructions.) Partly yes, it refers to a pattern of behaviour and an attitude which gradually emerged in the 1970s and was given a clarifying label as the 'inter-paradigm debate'.

How did it end?

In the mid and late 1980s we were no longer in the inter-paradigm debate, even if it was still used as a teaching tool and as schematism when some idea was to be evaluated 'across the discipline'. The 1980s constellation was different. Different because there was a change of fronts, and different because it moved to a different level (as argued above) and, not least, it moved beyond incommensurability.

In the triangular third debate, the three sides probably were never

equal. The Marxist/structuralist side did not achieve full equivalence, and at least for a while the initiative was with 'interdependence' (the liberalist brand of the day). As often noted, Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* (1979) and Gilpin's *War and Change in World Politics* (1981) were the revenge of realism, an attempt to relaunch more 'scientific' versions of realism. Especially Waltz's version, which became known under the name Robert Cox and Richard Ashley gave to them: 'neo-realism' (Cox, 1981; Ashley, 1984).

What is 'neo' about it? What distinguishes the new realism from the classical one? Often the answer is given that the old one argued from human nature, whereas neo-realism bases its realism in the anarchic nature of the international system. If that is the criterion, neo-realism dates back to the 1950s, when Herz as well as Waltz emphasised strongly that they did not include any premises about human nature, that their arguments were based in social features peculiar to 'the international'.[12] There have all along been quite different versions of how to ground realism – human nature, international structure, philosophy of history, knowledge pessimism (Wæver, 1992, ch. 3). Thus the 'basis' can hardly be the defining criterion for neo-realism. The really new thing about neo-realism is its *concept of science*. General speculation and reflection is no longer sufficient, realism has to express itself in the form of *theory*, of a system of clearly specified sentences, cf. the title of a Waltz article: 'Realist Thought and Neo-Realist Theory' (1990). In this sense the shift from realism to neo-realism can be seen as a delayed and displaced victory for the 'scientific' side of the second debate.

This change has important and interesting effects on the relationship among 'paradigms'. (Neo-)Realism is no longer an ethico-philosophical position. Sweeping statements on the nature of life and politics are replaced by precise statements. Compare the rhetoric of classical realists like Morgenthau, Kissinger and Liska who generalise about the nature of human life (not necessarily human nature, but wisdom about the human condition) and tell stories about the inherently tragic nature of politics and other lessons at a level close to philosophy of history.[13] Neo-realism in contrast says only 'a small number of big and important things' (Waltz, 1986, p. 329), a conscious self-limitation. Becoming scientific implies a certain minimalism, and plenty of space is left for developing theory and empirical studies on a number of other factors.

Liberal theory underwent a parallel development. It moved away from being a general interpretation of the nature of international relations or an idea of overall developments, and concentrated instead on asking a few precise questions. Or maybe simply one: 'how institutions affect incentives facing states' (Keohane, 1989, p. 11). And the principal thesis is



Figure 7.2 The neo-neo synthesis

that variations in the institutionalization of world politics exert significant impacts on the behaviour of governments. In particular, patterns of cooperation and discord can be understood only in the context of the institutions that help define the meaning and importance of state action. (Keohane, 1989, p. 2)

As a basis for investigating this, the anarchy assumption of neo-realism is taken as a useful starting point. As Keohane argues, if one smuggles on board cosmopolitan preferences it is not surprising that one reaches the conclusion that regimes are important. By basing instead the argument on (what is claimed to be) realist premises with states as egoistic, rational actors, it can be shown that institutions are possible and relevant *even* on these restricted premises. The neo-liberal institutionalists search in parallel with the neo-realists for still more limited, precise, formula-like assertions that can be reduced to simple analytical statements amenable to tests and theory.

This is not to say that neoliberal institutionalism gives us the answer – only that it gets the question right. (Keohane, 1989, p. 11)

As they are both extremely American, it might be appropriate to notice that neo-realism and neo-liberalism both became 'leaner and meaner'.

During the 1980s, realism became neo-realism and liberalism neo-liberal institutionalism. Both underwent a self-limiting redefinition towards an anti-metaphysical, theoretical minimalism, and they became thereby increasingly compatible. A dominant *neo-neo synthesis* became the research programme of the 1980s (Figure 7.2). No longer were realism and liberalism 'incommensurable' – on the contrary they shared a 'rationalist' research programme, a conception of science, a shared willingness to operate on the premise of anarchy (Waltz) and investigate the evolution of co-operation and whether institutions matter (Keohane). Inside this we saw both the emergence of direct attempts at synthesis (Ruggie, 1983; Buzan *et al.*, 1993) and a standard type of *International*

Organization article operationalising and testing realism and liberalism against each other in a specific field, but with a clear idea that they could be brought back into conversation.

My term 'neo-neo' does not refer to an idea that this is newer than the new, a reformulation of neo-realism for instance. It refers first of all to the synthesis between realism and liberalism that became possible, when realism was transformed into neo-realism and liberalism into neo-liberal institutionalism; it is the synthesis of the two neo-schools and became possible by their very neo-ness.

In this cross-field produced by their *rapprochement*, one can find much of the empirical studies of the 1980s, especially the typical 'theory guided' and/or 'theory testing' article in *International Organization*. Regime theory, co-operation under anarchy, hegemonic stability, alliance theory, trade negotiations, and Buzanian security analysis can all be seen as located in this field.

In this environment, the main line of controversy shifted to the opposite direction as one between rationalists and reflectivists, the post-modernism debate. As the previous line of debate 'dried out', the radicals entered to fill the vacuum. Thus the two main poles became on the one hand a neo-realist, neo-liberal synthesis and on the other reflectivism (cf. Figure 7.3, debate 4a in Table 7.3).

This constellation became authorised by Keohane's presidential address for ISA 1988 where he discussed 'two approaches to international institutions'. The two approaches were on the one side the rationalist, clearly referring to the merged neo-realist neo-liberalist research programme of which he himself is one of the leaders, and the other side what Keohane united under the label 'reflectivists' which was to cover those inspired by French post-modernism, those with German hermeneutics as well as late-Wittgensteinian rules-perspectives and social constructivism. (Sometimes, the label reflectivist has – consciously or not – been changed to *reflexivists* in order to point to the self-reflective nature of the new critical approaches.)

Reflectivists, according to Keohane, are characterised by emphasising *interpretation*, the *reflections* of the actors as central to institutions. Norms and regimes cannot be studied positivistically but have to be seen as inter-subjective phenomena only researchable by non-positivist methods (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986). Institutions are not something actors rationally construct following from their interests, since they act in meta-institutions (such as the principle of sovereignty) which create the actors rather than the other way round. Institutions and actors constitute each other mutually.[14]

That this rationalist–reflectivist axis was the main line of struggle was



Figure 7.3 IR debate of the 1980s

to be registered in many ways in the 1980s. Many younger academics who were to be evaluated – for tenure or positions – or had articles refereed in this period will have stories to tell about the vehemence of resistance against especially post-structuralism. Also articles allegedly not dealing with this line of controversy reveal it. For instance Keohane in a presentation of the relationship between neo-realism and neo-liberalism argues like this:

> Neoliberal institutionalism (. . .) shares some important intellectual commitments with neorealism. Like neorealists, neoliberal institutionalists seek to explain behavioral regularities by examining the nature of the decentralized international system. Neither neorealists nor neoliberal institutionalists are content with interpreting texts: both sets of theorists believe that there is an international political reality that can be partly understood, even if it will always remain to some extent veiled. (Keohane, 1989, p. 8)

It is visible here how the unity of the neo-neo position is partly argued by reference to some unnamed academics who 'are content with interpreting texts'.

In the new set-up it could finally be noted how the reflectivists carry out a flanking operation (see Figure 7.3). In their work to reshape themselves in scientific form, realism as well as liberalism had to leave behind some of their traditional fields, political statesmen in the case of realism, and ethics in the case of liberalism. Reflectivists attempted to articulate these classical issues against the two neo-schools, who had become too scientific for such matters. Post-structuralists have argued that classical realism was in many ways superior to neo-realism (cf. e.g. Ashley, 1984; Der Derian, 1987). Ethics, a traditionally liberalist theme, has in recent years been articulated more often from a reflectivist basis (Brown, 1992).

Why is reflectivism placed in the same corner as Marxism, why the

vague covering term 'radicalism'? Reflectivists do not share many assumptions with the Marxists. Thus, if one wants to make an ahistorical model of different schools, they have to have clearly separate positions. But when the models are snapshots at a given time, they can be located in the same place – radicalism – since post-modernist approaches largely replaced Marxism as the 'extreme contender', the radical challenge. Some Marxists might claim that this is a plot of the establishment, because post-modernism is ultimately reactionary and thus it was a nice move for the establishment to get rid of the really dangerous challenge, Marxism, and be hospitable to an ultimately undangerous new challenger, post-modernism. Post-modernists will emphasise how their criticism of logo-centric, Western, essentialist theories punches Marxism at least as hard as it does the establishment, and therefore criticism has become more radical as they took over. Watching with the task of writing the history of the discipline, it can just be noticed that the role of Marxism as contender in great debates clearly has waned. There is still – maybe increasingly – important work from Marxists that contributes significantly in IPE, in foreign policy theory and not least in macro-historical reflection on the emergence and evolution of the modern state. In the debates which the discipline uses to orient itself, the position which used to be occupied by Marxists was in the mid and late 1980s taken over by post-modernists.

The rationalist–reflectivist axis was not the only but the biggest axis in the 1980s. In a sense it was supplemented by a perpendicular but shorter one: the debate over absolute and relative gains (debate 4b in Table 7.3).[15] The remaining short distance between neo-realism and neo-liberalism is being argued out in this debate, which clearly echoes old realist–liberalist debates, but in its form is very post-third debate like: 'this is not the inter-paradigm debate' (as Keohane said in a panel on the relative/absolute gains debate at the APSA meeting in 1992; cf. also Keohane, 1993a, pp. 291ff), this is not about incommensurable paradigms. We agree on 90 per cent and the remainder is essentially an empirical question.[16] The proportions of how much state action is driven by relative and how much by absolute gains and under what conditions, that is a researchable matter wonderfully suited for the rationalist, neo-neo research programme. And actually this has become a cottage industry for the most mathematical modellers in the discipline. Not many of those who originally formulated the IR theory issues behind this can follow the Snidals and the Powells into their equations, but this is logically the apex of the neo-neo programme. One might even speculate that causality runs the opposite way: this business boomed exactly because it was so modelable – finally International Relations could make

Table 7.3 *Comparing the third and the fourth debate*

	3rd debate (Inter-Paradigm Debate)	Debate 4a (Reflectivist–Rationalist)	Debate 4b (absolute-relative gains)
Form of relationship among debaters	Incommensurability	War	Differences within a research programme
Theme (or substance) of disagreement	World View	Philosophy	Empirical question to be settled
Combatants	The Three paradigms	Neo-Neo synthesis against post-modernists	Neo-Realists versus Neo-Liberal Institutionalists

it into the *American Political Science Review* with articles full of equations. Most important is, however, to notice that the absolute/relative gains debate is not just any debate, but a very well structured debate among participants who have been striving to set up a joint framework. Therefore it was possible to conduct such a disciplined debate, with so much agreement, and lessons about how well organised it has been, logically should not be used to tell others how to discuss (for instance: use game theory), because this well-organised debate was only possible because it was located in a very particular place: within the neo-neo aspiration for agreement.

Thus, it should be clear, that the fourth debate is not the third, the inter-paradigm debate. Table 7.3 sums up how on all three defining dimentions, it has changed. Not only has this move taken us beyond the inter-paradigm debate; now we are probably *after* the fourth debate (Wæver, 1994).

In the 1990s there have been tendencies towards opening up a middle ground on the rationalist/reflectivist axis. After the clear polarisation between rationalists and reflectivists which was at times a rather tough struggle not least in the USA in the 1980s, we have in the 1990s witnessed increasing signs of *rapprochement* between the two. Among leading rationalists there have been signs of increasing boredom in relation to the rational choice extremes and on the side of the reflectivists we can see what could be called *post-radical reflectivism*, a move away from the self-marginalising guerrilla approaches towards attempts to contribute to conceptualisations and handling of various issues. Discussions on 'sovereignty' have been one meeting point, where

rationalists have admitted the existence of 'deep conventions' and thereby moved towards acknowledging the role of constitutive principles like sovereignty, very close to writings of some reflectivists (Wendt and Duvall, 1989; Keohane, 1993a). Along the axis of debate of the 1980s – rationalist/reflectivist – we thus see an increasing marginalisation of extreme rationalists (rational choice) and of extreme anti-IR approaches (deconstructivists), and the emergence of a middle ground where neo-institutionalists from the rationalist side meet constructivists arriving from the reflectivist side (Figure 7.4). More 'philosophical' issues are increasingly welcome in the mainstream.

At the rationalist end, we have witnessed a certain emptying of the energy of the neo-neo programme. Joseph Nye has pointed out that neo-realism in the 1980s was often wedded to rational actor approaches, to rational choice theories and expected utility models. These are not really theories, they lack questions to play with, and these they could get from neo-realism (and one could add: often in comparative tests of neo-liberal and neo-realists hypotheses).

> Rational-choice theories can be parsimonious and powerful, but as research strategies, they run risks that are reinforced by the sparse structure of neorealism. (. . .) The benefit of marrying rational choice with neorealist approaches is a double parsimony. The danger is that each already has a negative heuristic that directs attention away from preference formation and transnational interactions. (Nye, 1988, p. 248)

Stated differently: Keohane and others have in the 1980s – especially around the journal *International Organization* – conducted for the discipline a surprisingly consistent and systematic attempt to create cumulative research from a few theoretical questions (the consequences of anarchy, of polarity and of institutionalisation). This has naturally pushed in the direction of not too philosophical articles but often sophisticated methods for testing. This has been useful and successful. But boring. This project cannot keep its hold on one's attention. A few continue along with testing and modelling central variables. There is, for example, a resurgence of writings on the importance of bi- versus multi-polarity, which is partly triggered by the political situation (end of the Cold War), but partly by the fact that this is the dimension Waltz's theory points out as that to be analysed. A structural shift in world politics according to Waltz *has* to be a change at level 3, i.e. of polarity. And then it seems so wonderfully measurable.

But what if we approach this slightly more reflectively? Isn't it possible that we watch a change at some other level? Maybe the second Waltzian level? Are we approaching neo-medieval or post-modern political structures? This can be analysed through a Waltzian/Ruggian conception



Figure 7.4 The 1990s

of structure as a possible second tier change possibly combined with a study of the constant reformulation of principles in a praxis/structure cycle inspired by Giddens, Luhmann or post-structuralism (cf. Ruggie, 1983, 1993; Wæver, 1991; forthcoming a). This is just one example of interesting developments that are of interest to the rationalists but somehow better articulated from the reflectivist side (or at least by giving the rationalist theory a socially constructed status). Some of the semi-philosophical question asks for at least English school reflections but probably also more refined analysis of the discursively constructed meta-institutions of the system. The issue of *sovereignty* especially has pushed the rationalists out of their own garden. Sovereignty is clearly not an 'institution' in the narrow rationalist sense, but rather a 'thick' social phenomenon with historicity. And it is hard to avoid the centrality of the concept and possible changes in it for our present situation.

From the opposite direction we see the beginnings of 'post-radical reflectivism' – reflectivists not sticking to the post-structuralist guerrilla war against the 'system', but also conducting concrete analysis in dialogue with the establishment.[17] An important feature of post-radical reflectivism is that it does not continue to ghettoise itself, as post-structuralism partly did in the 1980s. In a situation where the rationalist corner has reached the point where realists and liberalists agree more than 90 per cent, only discuss details and these details are tested with much mathematics, it can hardly surprise that moderate reflectivists like Ruggie and even Wendt are met with considerable openness.

Recent years have witnessed an increasing interest in the so-called English school. This would seem to fit nicely into the scheme. The English school is a respectable, traditional approach which includes quasi-philosophical and historical reflection, and especially it interrogates deep institutions in the system. Thus, it can relatively easily be linked to more or less post-modernist notions, an emphasis on the cultural colouring of international systems and especially the general 'radical' interest in thinking the basic categories of the international

system instead of taking them as mechanical givens. At the same time, the classics of the English school, especially Bull's *Anarchical Society* is a comprehensible, seemingly straightforward discussion of the actual system with relatively clear, operational concepts. Thus, the American mainstream can find a moderate way to extend its institutionalism in a not too dangerous way by using Bull (and reading him almost as a regime theorist or neo-liberal institutionalist).[18] The new wave of English School enthusiasm thus ties in with the attempted *rapprochement* between reflectivists and rationalists, with the deradicalisation of reflectivism and the rephilosophisation of the rationalists.

What's wrong with the inter-paradigm debate?

This implies actually two questions:

1 Is it true? Is the triangle of incommensurable paradigms the final, inevitable pattern? Can we rise above incommensurability, or is this 'relativist' argument actually impossible to deal with, because one's own argument will always remain one of the positions in this world of self-reaffirming positions who can't establish a joint language? (cf. Cox, 1981; Neufeld, 1993; Rengger, 1988, 1989, 1992).
2 What's wrong with keeping this as an image of the discipline, using it as a handy way of introducing the discipline to students, and as a map when discussing broadly the development of the discipline? Is it so important to argue over whether we are in the inter-paradigm debate or not?

A post-modern solution to the problem of incommensurability

It has often been assumed that post-structuralists should love the argument of incommensurability. These post-modernists allegedly argue the impossibility of communication (or rather the impossibility of actual communication approximating our ideal of communication as the transmittance of messages meaning the same to sender and receiver; of course, 'communication' as a social phenomenon takes place all the time). And here comes a surprising reinforcement from (defectors?) among the Anglo-Saxon philosophers of ordinary language and of theory of science. Thus, post-structuralists should be the most radical supporters of incommensurability, the arguers of 'radical incommensurability' (Rengger, 1989). I will argue the opposite: the quandary of incommensurability – which most commonsensical Anglo-Saxon minded social scientists find unacceptable but difficult to rebut – can be dealt with most fundamentally from a post-structuralist perspective.

The first step is to notice that the concept of incommensurability is not the problem, the problem is the concept of commensurability. The *argument* about incommensurability rests on a dichotomy, between on the one hand radical incommensurability (and ultimate incommunicability) *among* paradigms and on the other hand radical commensurability and communicability *within* paradigms. A post-structuralist immediately reacts against the latter: total understanding *never* happens. No communication (in the phenomenological sense) is ever communication (in the ideal sense). But communication takes place all the time, so obviously human beings experience that it makes sufficient sense for us (or most of us) to go on. (Some even make a living of it, for instance as IR scholars and teachers.) We do not have total incommunicability all over. But this does not mean that we should lean on the image of transparent meaning transference, where the parties argue with concepts that have been given an ultimate definition. Post-structuralists argue that all meaning systems are open-ended systems of signs referring to signs referring to signs.[19] No concept can therefore have an ultimate, unequivocal meaning. The image of closed paradigms or any other closed culture assumes that a closed sign system has been achieved which gives a stable and ultimate meaning to its participants. This would be possible within French *structuralism*, but exactly not in *post*-structuralism, the main difference between the two being that structuralism is a theory of signs, post-structuralism a critique of the sign; structuralism investigates how social phenomena can be explained by stable and pervasive meaning systems, post-structuralism shows how all meaning systems are precarious, self-defeating and only *strive* for closure without ever succeeding.

The image of paradigms internally communicating, externally only interacting, closely resembles late eighteenth–early nineteenth-century *romanticism*. Romanticism is a belief in closed cultures. Meaning rests with the community. Cultures are the carriers of meaning systems, and can only be understood from within, by the participants who share these cultures as complete persons, aesthetically, linguistically and sometimes even ethnically or historically. Especially in romantic nationalism it is clear how one assumes total understanding within (the complete, gratifying *understanding* in the warm embrace of the nation) and the total lack of understanding between cultures.

Incommensurability is only a meaningful term if combined with romanticising the warmth of community (as we see in its replay today in US multi-culturalism). Incommensurability as concept derives its meaning from a distinction, the distinction between incommensurability and commensurability – a deeply problematic distinction, as it becomes

most clear by investigating the concept of commensurability. Anglo-Saxon criticisers have attacked 'the myth of the framework' (Popper, 1970) or 'the very idea of a conceptual scheme' (Davidson, 1974). They focus on the exaggeration of *limits* to communication. A solution to the problem of incommensurability is to be found in an investigation of the exaggeration of *unlimited* communication.[20]

It could seem surprising that the theme of incommensurability arose from within Anglo-Saxon philosophy – why not the allegedly more relativist French? (The seeming parallelism of Kuhn and 'the French' has tempted IR authors to link Kuhn, Foucault, Wittgenstein and Gadamer (Rengger, 1988, 1989; George and Campbell, 1990).) It is, however, not at all surprising that incommensurability arose out of Anglo-Saxon philosophy of science. Actually it is a logical question to arise out of their problematique – only to those who have believed in complete communication can walls of incommunicability and incommensurability appear. (As often noticed, logical positivism was in many ways a rerun of at least aspects of Enlightenment ideals, including the belief in a rational, universal language and transparent communication. It ended in many of the same problems – and generated thus a similar romanticist/culturalist counter-movement.)[21]

When we have deconstructed this image of walls encircling crowds who are forced to communicate meaningfully only within their throng, and replaced it by a general image of difficult, incomplete, partial 'communication' which might exhibit variations in density and thus patterns or groupings, but no fixed, ultimate distinctions of an inside/outside nature, there is no reason to assume (radical) incommensurability (specifically) among paradigms. There is, however, one remaining argument which is often made for incommensurability: these paradigms are really political groupings. The three 'paradigms' are obviously the three classical political main orientations: conservative, liberal and radical. Therefore, they can never be brought to agree. Not because of cognitive filters or the closedness of sign systems, but because their world views are tied with different *normative* programmes (Krasner, 1989, pp. 425f; Little and Smith, 1991). This argument, however, ought to lead to a *general* relativism or perspectivism. It can hardly sustain a picture of e.g. three paradigms. Even if there are these three grand ideologies, political struggles do not consistently form themselves in such triangles. Why does this discipline then? Paradigms have to be applied first of all as sociological concepts for discipline internal developments.

Do international relationists today still use 'incommensurability' as implicit guide? No, we have seen the neo-neo synthesis which strives for

a classical shared methodology, and even among the theories that do not vie for such close merger, there is a changed attitude. The trend of the last decade has exactly been for all the more dominant theories also to establish more self-knowledge and a better understanding of their limits, inner logic and their couplings to other kinds of theory. Thus, the mode of relating schools in the 1990s is not incommensurability but a kind of 'division of labour'. What the theory of science rationale of this attitude can be is a little less clear.

Based on realist premises (i.e. that all theories are ultimately talking about the same reality out there), a division of labour can have evolved because the different explanatory sources are placed in different areas. Each theory carves out its own explanatory mechanisms and sources in ways that do not overlap. In the end they partly explain the same object, but they do not compete for this, and should not be tested against each other. They should be articulated, since they base themselves in separate parts of the system. Or as Ruggie has recently put it:

> Clearly, different bodies of contemporary international relations theory are better equipped to elucidate different domains of contemporary change and continuity. (. . .) Each, therefore, can become a 'grand theory' only by discounting or ignoring altogether the integrity of those domains of social life that its premises do not encompass. Nor are the various bodies of extant theory in any sense additive, so that we could arrive at a grand theory by steps. (1993, p. 169)

There is no overarching logic *of* the different stories. They each have unfolded from their own inner logic, constructing a coherent story which has, however, in the last decade zoomed in on specific, partial levels, with the effect that the theories can be treated as complementary sources of negative predictions.

The theories do not modify each other – they have each their separate area: domestic, international political structure, systemic pressure, political action and interaction. They are each absolute demands. The theoretician has to accept the inner logic of Waltzianism when he enters an analysis in terms of international political structure. The same for the other places. They each have their inner logics, but they have managed to carve out complementary sections and they have made linkages that allow for a mutual serviceability.

This implicit emerging attitude, however well it functions as social ideal in the discipline, comes to rest on some heroic assumptions if it stays on realist ground (realist in theory of science sense). The different theories have moved in the direction of different fields/levels, but still they do have a lot of shared references (state, interest, politics,

etc.) that are given different meaning in the different theories. To a realist, it then becomes problematic to combine the theories. This new attitude *could* then be reformulated as a more radical constructivism in which the objects are seen as constructed by the separate theories.

Therefore these do not compete for explaining 'the same'. They each do different jobs. The theories can only be linked externally, when one theory reaches out on its own terms for another theory to exploit it, which it can then only do by grasping the inner logic of this other theory and its material. This self-referentiality of the theories in no way prevents researchers from entering several of these – the limitations are not in our heads but in the logic of the theories and their ensuing 'realities'. Grand 'synthesis' and (literal) co-operation (simultaneous running) of several theories (that might in some abstract sense be logically incompatible), thus becomes possible if the meta-theory is adjusted towards constructivism (Luhmann, 1990a, 1990b; Wæver, 1994). This in a sense is to play *with* incommensurability, but against the cognitivist idea of different 'lenses' that create different pictures of 'the same'.

A strategic approach to 'IR debates'

The second question is the famous *and so what?* Does the inter-paradigm debate idea harm anyone? Yes, there is a tendency in it to produce straw men, not least of the realists (cf. Buzan's chapter in this volume; Wæver, 1992, ch. 3). But more importantly these debates and the ideas about the debates are part of the self-reflection and thus self-management of the discipline. Thus, there are dangerous effects of counting wrongly.

My argument in terms of four debates is unconventional. According to established wisdom there is no fourth debate. We are still in or after the third, and now I even claim that we are leaving the fourth. The disagreement stems from the peculiar way of counting in International Relations: 1st debate, 2nd debate, 3rd debate, 3rd debate. Three is a magic number – three paradigms, three debates. In academic debates, there always have to be three positions, three options, three scenarios.[22] As argued (above, and Wæver, 1994), I am convinced that there are (at least) four major debates. To ignore this enumeration error is problematic because it means to assimilate the fourth into the third. Hereby the third debate is prolonged. Self-reflection in International Relations of the 1980s and 1990s is blocked if presented with the choice of either using the triangle as scheme or abstaining from pictures of its own development. We need new metaphors and depictions to foster self-reflection in the discipline.

This implies that a sub-theme of this article has been the uses and abuses of 'schools'. Danger arises especially when one model of schools gets fixed, such as the timeless triangle, and projected backwards as well as forwards, as the map of all possible positions. On the other hand, images of the internal battlelines do exist and they have effects. Thus, it is worth taking seriously how they function, what they are, and what could possibly be achieved by trying to reshape them. The 'debates' operate as a dialectic between implicit pictures and articulate self-representations of the discipline. The debates are partly constructed and artificially imposed on much more diverse activities, partly they are implicit operators in actual academic practice, they are distinctions involved in the work of the discipline. Academic work is always guided by a picture of the discipline itself as the immediate social context. Each of the debates first emerged as constellation, as implicit picture – the picture is not totally consistent from person to person, but since debate in a discipline is an inter-subjective and interactive phenomenon, there will be a certain convergence. Then in a second step, this constellation is *labelled*, which reinforces the constellation, but also guides the phase of moving beyond it, because the next phase will be defined in relation to this picture of the discipline.

Probably, 'the inter-paradigm debate' should be retained as a very informative metaphor for telling discipline history about the 1970s–early 1980s. To grasp the later 1980s and 1990s we need new images, possibly like the neo-neo merger and the pincer movement of the radicalists and then later the two-sided exclusion beyond the boundaries of boredom and boundaries of negativity resulting in a new middle-ground which is not just any middle-ground ('let's meet'), but a specific one because it has grown out of the self-conceived positions and battle-lines of the preceding period. So again: even the 'after the fourth debate' of the 1990s will be misunderstood if read as a *rapprochement* among the positions of the third debate (the inter-paradigm debate) when actually it takes place among the contestants of the fourth debate (rationalists and reflectivists). There is a difference between being after the fourth debate and after the third debate. Especially if one wants to be prepared for the fifth debate, which will inevitably come. The discipline seems to organise itself through a constant oscillation between grand debates and periods in-between where the previous contestants meet. One of these debates was the inter-paradigm debate. None of these debates lasts forever. Even if they could all be constructed as nice typologies – exhaustive and exclusive – they would still become misleading at a point when the practitioners had organised themselves along different lines, arguing the next debate.

NOTES

I would like to thank Barry Buzan, Richard Little, Jaap de Wilde, Lene Hansen and Wojchiech Kostecki as well as participants in the Aberystwyth conference for helpful comments on earlier drafts.

1 Keohane and Nye, for instance, in the most famous book of the period, *Power and Independence*, solved the problem through what was in part a dualist approach: realism got what was realism's (conflictual politics among not too civilised states), while an alternative model of 'complex interdependence' was deemed more relevant to politics among the developed, democratic states. This complementarist approach was not easily absorbed by the academic world (Suhr, 1995) – complementarity was not much reflected on, while *Power and Independence* (like other contemporary books) was taken as 'a new, alternative paradigm' (which was probably not totally against the intentions of its authors).
2 Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* appeared in 1962, but gained much wider circulation in the social sciences after the publication of Lakatos and Musgrave (1970).
3 Incommensurability does not – as often wrongly suggested – imply the impossibility of dialogue, in which case the term 'inter-paradigm debate' would be a contradiction in terms. It means first of all, that no neutral language is available into which the competing theories can be translated and then compared (Kuhn, 1970c). It might be possible to translate one theory into the language of another, and this is in a sense what we are all asked to strive for (Kuhn, 1970c; Bernstein, 1991, pp. 65ff), but we still have to recognise that this is not the same as to understand the other theory as that which is to itself, in its own language, nor does it supply any measure outside the competing theories by which to judge them and choose the better one.
4 It is, however, possible to make a distinction between the terms pluralism and liberalism, cf. Richard Little's chapter in this volume.
5 The most obvious adjustment to make – especially in the British context – would be to merge the tri-partition of the inter-paradigm debate with another equally famous tri-partition, that of Martin Wight (realist, rationalist, revolutionist or Machiavelli, Grotius and Kant); cf. Meyers, 1990; Buzan, this volume. Most obviously Wight's Grotian/rationalist position is absent in the inter-paradigm debate, although it is possible either to interpret realism in a very statesman-diplomacy-international law manner and thus include a lot of the rationalist position (McKinlay and Little, 1986) or to see Grotianism as a brand of liberalism. Wight himself makes to some extent the Grotian position a compromise position between the other two and thus creates more of a continuum than a triangle. How to read the *nature* of Wight's 'debate' in contrast to the other contrived debates in IR self-presentation, I have addressed briefly towards the end of Wæver (1994). How to place the revival of the 'English school' as such in the – more or less triangular – map of IR theory, is briefly dealt with below.
6 Also in the case of the first and second debates, the major explicit *debates* and characterisations appeared after the alleged occurrence of 'the debate'. The first debate is normally presented as occurring in the 1930s and sometimes

1940s, but the major works defining a debate appeared from 1939 to the early 1950s. The second debate is normally said to have taken place in the 1950s and 1960s; the major debate that gave words to this took place from 1966 (Bull, 1966; Kaplan, 1966) and was collected in Knorr and Rosenau (1969). The third debate as a pattern and an often implicit attitude to other schools could be seen to emerge during the 1970s, but got its name(s) around 1980–5.

7 'Ontology' as the issue of 'what is' has become a fashionable label for that which was discussed in the third debate (the inter-paradigm debate): basic images of international relations, for instance state-centric versus pluralist. More seriously, the term ontology should refer to more basic questions about what 'stuff' the world is made up of: relations, processes, action, units (self-conscious, present to themselves and relating to other units each given in and of themselves), consciousness, the march of the world spirit, or power? Cf. Patomäki (1992) and Ringmar (1995).

This devaluation of 'ontology' can have confusing effects regarding the conception of debates. Real 'philosophical' ontology was not discussed until the fourth debate, whereas the watered-out version of ontology can be applied to that which was discussed in the third debate (then without the term).

8 This is probably spelled out most clearly in the articles by Michael Banks (1984, 1985, 1986). Also Rosenau was in the late 1970s and early 1980s very clear about linking substantive premises and methodological impulses into closed paradigms and emphasising that they were all equally closed: 'Openness to new data supporting alternative approaches and resulting readiness to change approaches (. . .) Virtually nil' (1982, p. 3). The 'inter-paradigm' terminology has then been employed in a number of articles and studies on various specific issues which are related to each of the 'paradigms', cf. e.g. Hoffman (1987).

9 Stefano Guzzini a bit speculatively links the inter-paradigm debate to the second debate. The attacks of behaviouralism had weakened the *boundaries* of the discipline, the distinctiveness of international relations, and the inter-paradigm debate was a reaction to this. Thus, he reads the further debate as a search for a new delineation of 'the international unknown' (1992, pp. 136 and 145f).

10 This is at least true for *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Kuhn's later development is a complicated issue (excellently investigated by Hoyningen-Huene, 1993). He partly followed the same track as the international relationists (from sociology to world meanings). Kuhn, however, is uncompromising in avoiding an individual focus and instead concentrating on the similarity/difference relations shared by a field's practitioners that binds their community together. Kuhn's second trend of movement has been from assuming that one encountered the world through *seeing* it, to encountering it through *language* (Hoyningen-Huene, 1993, pp. 100ff; Kuhn, 1993).

11 For some reason, this optimistic, evolutionary interpretation of Kuhn – emphasising normal science as an ideal rather than the incommensurability as pluralism – came to dominate more consistently the self-reflection of the

sub-discipline of Comparative Foreign Policy and to some extent the wider Foreign Policy Analysis; cf. Hermann and Peacock (1987).

12 John Herz, for example, wrote in 1950 'Whether man is by nature peaceful and cooperative, or domineering and aggressive, is not the question. The condition that concerns us here is not a biological or anthropological but a social one' (1950, p. 157). Kenneth Waltz's book *Man, the State and War* (1959) was organised around the argument in favour of 'third image' explanations of war, i.e. causation from the structure of the international system in contrast to the first image (human nature and psychological mechanisms) and second image (the nature of the state). The distance to Niebuhrian realism was explicit in Waltz's contention with the first image.

13 Classical realism was a full and whole philosophy or ideology with expressions like: 'The statesman is therefore like one of the heroes in classical drama who has had a vision of the future but cannot transmit it directly to his fellow-men and who cannot validate its "truth". Nations learn only by experience; they "know" only when it is too late to act. But statesmen must act as *if* their intuition were already experience, as if their aspiration were truth' (Kissinger, 1957, p. 329).

14 This formulation might lead some to emphasise in their interpretation of the rationalist–reflectivist debate, that the reflectivists are interested in the *perceptions* and *motives* of the actors, which would be incredibly un-post-structuralist, and *de facto* leave the reflectivist position for hermeneutics. This, however, was not the main gist of Keohane's argument. He focused rightly on the fact, that the rationalists start out from actors and construct institutions from the preferences and rationality of the actors (even if *liberal* rationalists are very interested in feed-back that shape in turn the preferences of the actors). The reflectivists see 'institutions' in a wider and deeper sociological sense as shaping the identities and meaning spaces for the actors. (This is important to stress, because this is where the rationalists in the late 1980s and 1990s increasingly found resonance in the establishment, cf. below.)

15 Grieco (1988, 1990), Keohane (1989, pp. 10, 14 and 18). Baldwin (1993) has recently collected most of the main interventions in the debate.

16 David A. Baldwin in the preface to *Neorealism and Neoliberalism* compares the book to its predecessor from 1986, *Neorealism and its Critics*, but claims that 'Unlike that volume, however, the contributors to this one share many fundamental assumptions about the nature and purpose of social inquiry. This allows them to engage one another's arguments directly and results in a more focused and productive debate' (Baldwin, 1993, p. 3). Actually, figures like Waltz, Keohane and Gilpin of the previous book also 'share many fundamental assumptions about the nature and purpose of social inquiry', the differences between the two books are (a) that the reflectivists (Ashley, Cox) participated in the 1986 book, not in 1992, and (b) that there is a growing awareness of being 'beyond the inter-paradigm debate', of no longer rehearsing debates among positions that are not allowed to merge because they allegedly have different positions in a fundamental debate among incommensurable schools. Waltz at times reaffirms this image by insisting on

'pure' realism without any interest in accommodation, and thus the Baldwin remark was probably as much directed at him as at the reflectivists.

17 More eccentric are attempts at 'post-structural rationalism', which is a possibility since post-structuralist (and even more structuralist) linguistics open up the possibility of quite formalised treatments of the movements and patterns of discourse (Suganami, 1990; Wæver *et al.*, forthcoming).

18 Note the increasing number of references in Keohane's articles to Bull and recently also to Wight (1993b). Buzan's English school article (1993) is in this context interesting, (a) for the fact that the article is published in *International Organization*, (b) for the explicit argument made about the usefulness of the English school for the Americans. See also the explicit articles on regime theory and English school: Hurrell (1993), Evans and Wilson (1992), Knudsen (1994). On how to save the English school from the Americans, see Wæver (forthcoming).

19 The general concept of the sign is probably most clearly presented in Derrida (1978 [1967]), the consequences in relation to the image of 'communication' in Derrida (1977 [1972]). Laclau and Mouffe (1985) is a theory of politics generated from the constant but ultimately impossible attempts to create closed and stable systems of meaning.

20 A different argument against incommensurability which ultimately stems from the same problem has been nicely put by Stefano Guzzini: that one cannot give conclusive arguments for incommensurability since this would presuppose a common framework of meaning which is exactly what the incommensurability thesis denies (Guzzini in Guzzini, Patomäki and Walker, 1995). Thus, the incommensurability thesis can by definition not have proven itself beyond doubt.

21 This raises the more general question how wise it is to lump together (as 'the new') mixtures of 'French' post-structuralism, 'German' hermeneutics and 'Anglo-Saxon' late analytical philosophy and post-Popperian theory of science (as is done for instance by Rengger, 1988, 1989, who admits that this is an 'unholy alliance'; George and Campbell, 1990). These different 'critical' philosophies actually build on very different conceptions of basic philosophical issues. It is certainly possible and often valuable to engage these traditions in debates (cf. e.g. Bernstein, 1991), but for the purpose of an almost 'derived' debate like that in IR, it seems advisable to be more clear about premises and to take a more distinctly defined philosophical starting point.

Here I would suggest that one can by now rule that post-structuralism has become the most significant and sustained (!) voice in the 'radical' corner. The Hoffman–Rengger debate in 1988 had Hoffman suggesting that critical theory was (German) Frankfurt school critical theory and Rengger advocating openness as to the possibility that (French) post-structuralism might equally well become a critical force (and to let at least the flowers bloom – with the tone that either it would be unsettled or Habermas would win). By now, very little has come out of the Habermas-inspired 'German' branch of critical theory in IR, whereas the 'French' brand has led to a network of writings at various levels of abstraction, from philosophical engagements with general IR theory to specific readings of texts in

international relations practice (cf. Wæver, 1992, ch. 9). Another important critical newcomer to IR is feminism, but also here the post-structuralist inspiration seems to be very important among the more theoretically inclined writers. The 1994 launching of a German journal of International Relations Theory (*ZIB, Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen*) might change this by getting more Habermasian IR in circuit (cf. Schaber and Ulbert, 1994). Also the 1995 introduction of a *European Journal of International Relations*, could have this effect.

22 The basic superstitional origin has been strengthened by features of modern bureaucracy and academia: a civil servant who has to present some options for a decision maker's choice will often come up with three suggestions: one which is unrealistic because it is too extreme in one direction, another which is impossibly far in the opposite direction and then the third in-between which the politician is supposed to pick. And in academic debates, an author will often present the discipline in terms of three positions: the two existing views who discuss with each other but are actually both faulted – the superior alternative is a third approach, mine. On this operation, see elegantly: Arendt (1972, p. 12).

REFERENCES

Alker, Hayward R. and Biersteker, Thomas J. (1984), 'The Dialectics of World Order: Notes for a Future Archaeologist of International Savoir Faire', *International Studies Quarterly*, 28 (2), pp. 121–42.

Arendt, Hannah (1972), 'Lying in Politics: Reflections on the Pentagon Papers', in *Crisis of the Republic* (San Diego, New York, London: Harvest/HBJ).

Ashley, Richard (1984), 'The Poverty of Neo-realism', *International Organization*, 38 (2), pp. 225–86.

Baldwin, David (ed.) (1993), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press).

Banks, Michael (1984), 'The Evolution of International Relations Theory', in Michael Banks (ed.), *Conflict in World Society: A New Perspective on International Relations* (Harvester), pp. 1–21.

(1985), 'The Inter-Paradigm Debate', in M. Light and A. J. R. Groom (eds.), *International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory* (London: Pinter), pp. 7–26.

(1986), 'The International Relations Discipline: Asset or Liability for Conflict Resolution', in E. A. Azar and J. W. Burton (eds.), *International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice* (Sussex: Wheatsheaf), pp. 5–27.

Bernstein, Richard J. (1991), *The New Constellation: The Ethical–Political Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press).

Biersteker, Thomas J. (1989), 'Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations', *International Studies Quarterly*, 33 (3), pp. 263–7.

Brown, Chris (1992), *International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches* (Harvester Wheatsheaf).

Bull, Hedley (1966 [1969]), 'International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach', in K. Knorr and J. Rosenau (eds.), *Contending Approaches to International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 20–38.

Buzan, Barry (1993), 'From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory meet the English School', *International Organization*, 47 (3), pp. 327–52.

Buzan, Barry, Little, Richard and Jones, Charles (1993), *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism* (New York: Columbia University Press).

Cox, R. (1981), 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', *Millennium*, 10 (2), pp. 126–55.

Davidson, Donald (1974), 'The Very idea of a Conceptual Scheme', *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, 47, pp. 5–20.

Der Derian, James (1987), *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement* (Oxford: Blackwell).

Derrida, Jacques (1977 [1972]), 'Signature Event Context', *Glyph*, 1, pp. 172–97.

(1978 [1967]), *Writing and Difference* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).

Evans, Tony and Wilson, Peter (1992), 'Regime Theory and the English School of International Relations: A Comparison', *Millennium*, 21 (3), pp. 329–52.

Feyerabend, Paul (1975), *Against Method* (London: Verso).

(1978), *Science in a Free Society* (London: Verso).

George, Jim and Campbell, David (1990), 'Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of Difference: Critical Social Theory and International Relations', *International Studies Quarterly*, 34 (3), pp. 269–94.

Gilpin, Robert (1981), *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press).

(1987), *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Grieco, Joseph M. (1988), 'Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism', *International Organization*, 42 (3), pp. 485–508.

(1990), *Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-tariff Barriers to Trade* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press).

Groom, A. J. R. (1988), 'Paradigms in Conflict: The Strategist, the Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher', *Review of International Studies*, 14 (2), pp. 97–115.

Guzzini, Stefano (1988), *T. S. Kuhn and International Relations: International Political Economy and the Inter-Paradigm Debate*, London School of Economics and Political Science: unpublished MA thesis.

(1992), *The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold: Realism in International Relations/International Political Economy* (Florence: European University Institute *Working Paper* SPS 92/20; revised version forthcoming at Routledge).

Guzzini, Stefano, Patomäki, Heikki and Walker, R. B. J. (1995), 'A Concluding Trialogue', in Patomäki (ed.), *Peaceful Changes in World Politics* (Tampere: TAPRI).

Hermann, Charles F. and Peacock, Gregory (1987), 'The Evolution and Future of Theoretical Research in the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy', in Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley and James N. Rosenau (eds.), *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy* (Boston: Allen & Unwin), pp. 13–32.

Herz, John H. (1950), 'Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma', *World Politics*, 2 (2), pp. 157–80.

Hoffman, Mark (1987), 'Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate', *Millennium*, 16 (2), pp. 231–49.

Hoffmann, Stanley (1977), 'An American School Science: International Relations', *Dædalus*, 106 (3), pp. 41–60.

Holsti, K. J. (1985), *The Dividing Discipline – Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory* (Boston: Allen & Unwin).

(1986), 'The Horsemen of the Apocalypse: At the Gate, Detoured, or Retreating?', *International Studies Quarterly*, 30 (4), pp. 355–71.

(1988 [1967]), *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, 5th edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall).

(1993), 'International Relations at the End of the Millennium', *Review of International Studies*, 19 (4), pp. 401–8.

Hoyningen-Huene, Paul (1993), *Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhn's Philosophy of Science* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).

Hurrell, Andrew (1993), 'International Society and the Study of Regimes: A Reflective Approach' in Volker Rittberger (ed.), *Regime Theory and International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 49–72.

Janis, Irving and Mann, Leon (1977), *Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice and Commitment* (New York: Free Press).

Jervis, Robert (1970), *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

(1976), *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Kaplan, Morton A. (1966), 'The Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations', *World Politics*, 19 (1).

Kauppi, Mark V. and Viotti, Paul R. (1992), *The Global Philosophers: World Politics in Western Thought* (New York: Lexington Books).

Keohane, Robert (1989), *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press).

(1993a), 'Institutionalist Theory and the Realist Challenge: After the Cold War', in David Baldwin (ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press).

(1993b), *Hobbes's Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics: Sovereignty in International Society*, Paper presented at the Conference on Economic and Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: Agendas for the 1990s, Canberra, 28–30 July.

Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, J. (1977), *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little Brown).

Kissinger, Henry A. (1957), *A World Restored: Castlereagh, Metternich and the Restoration of Peace, 1812–1822* (Boston and London: Scott, Foresman & Co.).

Knorr, Klaus and Rosenau, James N. (eds.) (1969), *Contending Approaches to International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Knudsen, Tonny Brems (1994), *Det Nye Europa: Orden eller Kaos?*, University of Aarhus: MA thesis.

Krasner, Stephen D. (1989), 'Fortune, Virtue, and Systematic versus Scientific Inquiry', in Joseph Mruzel and James N. Rosenau (eds.), *Journeys through World Politics: Autobiographical Reflections of Thirty-four Academic Travellers* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books), pp. 417–27.

Kratochwil, F. and Ruggie, John G. (1986), 'International Organization: A State of the Art of an Art of the State', *International Organization*, 40 (4), pp. 753–75.

Kuhn, Thomas S. (1970a [1962]), *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd edition enlarged (Chicago:University of Chicago Press).

(1970b), 'Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research', in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds.), *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 1–23.

(1970c), 'Reflections on my Critics', in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds.), *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

(1993), 'Foreword' to Paul Hoyningen-Huene, *Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhn's Philosophy of Science* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).

Laclau, Ernesto and Mouffe, Chantal (1985), *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democracy* (London: Verso).

Lakatos, Imre and Musgrave, Alan (eds.) (1970), *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Lapid, Yosef (1989), 'The Third Debate: on the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-positivist Era', *International Studies Quarterly*, 33 (3), pp. 235–54.

Lenin, V. I. (1916 [1966]), *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, in *Collected Works* (Moscow: Progress Publishers).

Little, Richard *et al.* (eds.) (1981), *Perspectives on World Politics* (London: Croom Helm).

Little, Richard and Smith, Michael (1991), *Perspectives on World Politics*, 2nd edition (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul).

Luhmann, Niklas (1990a), *Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft* (Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp).

(1990b), *Soziologische Aufklärung 5: Konstruktivistische Perspektiven* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag).

Maghrori, Ray and Ramberg (eds.) (1982), *Globalism Versus Realism: International Relations' Third Debate?* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press).

Mansbach, Richard W. and Vasquez, John A. (1981), *In Search of Theory – A New Paradigm for Global Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press).

Masterman, Margaret (1970), 'The Nature of a Paradigm', in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds.), *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 59–89.

McKinlay, R. and Little, Richard (1986), *Global Problems in World Order* (London: Pinter).

Meyers, Reinhard (1990), 'Metatheoretische und methodologische Betrachtungen zur Theorie der internationalen Beziehungen', in *Politiche Vierteljahresschrift* (special issue on theories of international relations; ed. Volker Rittberger), Sonderheft 21/1990, pp. 48–68.

Neufeld, Mark (1993), 'Reflexivity and International Relations Theory', *Millennium*, 22 (1) (Spring), pp. 53–76.

Nye, Joseph (1988), 'Neorealism and Neoliberalism', *World Politics*, 40 (2), pp. 235–51.

Patomäki, Heikki (1992), 'What is it that Changed with the End of the Cold War? An Analysis of the Problem of Identifying and Explaining Change', in Pierre Allan and Kjell Goldmann (eds.), *The End of the Cold War: Evaluating Theories of International Relations* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), pp. 179–225.

Popper, Karl (1970), 'Normal Science and its Dangers', in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds.), *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 51–8.

Rengger, N. J. (1988), 'Going Critical? A Response to Hoffman', *Millennium*, 17 (1), pp. 81–9.

(1989), 'Incommensurability, International Theory and the Fragmentation of Western Political Culture', in John R. Gibbins (ed.), *Contemporary Political Culture: Politics in a Postmodern Age* (London: Sage/ECPR), pp. 237–50.

(1992), 'A City which Sustains all Things? Communitarianism and the Foundations of International Society', *Millennium*, 21 (3), pp. 353–69.

Ringmar, Erik (1995), 'Alexander Wendt – a Scientist Struggling with History', in Iver B. Neumann and Ole Wæver (eds.), *The Future of International Relations: Masters in the Making?* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul).

Rittberger, Volker and Wolf, Klaus-Dieter (1988), 'Problemfelder internationaler Beziehungen aus politologischer Sicht', *Tübinger Arbeitspapiere*, no. 5.

Rosenau, James N. (1982), *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, revised and enlarged edition (London/New York: Frances Pinter/Nichols).

Rothstein, R. (1972), *Planning, Prediction, and Policymaking in Foreign Affairs – Theory and Practice* (Boston: Little, Brown).

Ruggie, John G. (1983), 'Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neo-Realist Synthesis', *World Politics*, 36 (2), pp. 261–85.

(1993), 'Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations', *International Organization*, 47 (1), pp. 139–74.

Schaber, Thomas and Ulbert, Cornelia (1994), 'Reflexivität in den Internationalen Beziehungen: Literaturbericht zum Beitrag kognitiver, reflexiver und interpretativer Ansätze zur dritten Theoriedebatte', *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 1 (1), pp. 139–69.

Smith, Steve (1987), 'Paradigm Dominance in International Relations: The Development of International Relations as a Social Science', *Millennium*, 16 (2), pp. 189–206.

Snyder, G. H. and Diesing, P. (1977), *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decisionmaking and System Structure in International Crisis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Suganami, Hidemi (1990), 'Bringing Order to the Causes of War Debates', *Millennium*, 19 (1), pp. 19–35.

Suhr, Michael (1996), 'Robert Keohane – a Contemporary Classic', in Iver B. Neumann and Ole Wæver (eds.), *Masters in the Making: Eleven International Relations Theorists Assessed* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul).

Viotti, Paul R. and Kauppi, Mark V (1993 [1987]), *International Relations Theory: Kauppi (1990) International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism* (New York: Macmillan).

Waltz, Kenneth (1959), *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press).

(1979), *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House).

(1986), 'Reflections on *Theory of International Politics*: A Response to My Critics', in Robert Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press).

(1990), 'Realist Thought and Neo-Realist Theory', *Journal of International Affairs*, 44 (1), pp. 21–37.

Wendt, Alexander (1992), 'Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization*, 46 (2), pp. 391–426.

Wendt, Alexander and Duvall, Raymond (1989), 'Institutions and International Order', in Ernst-Otto Cziempel and James N. Rosenau (eds.), *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s* (Lexington: Lexington Books), pp. 51–76.

Wæver, Ole (1991), 'Territory, Authority and Identity: The Late 20th Century Emergence of Neo-medieval Political Structures in Europe', paper presented at the inaugural EUPRA conference in Florence, November 1991.

(1992), *Introducktion til Studiet af International Politik* (Copenhagen: Forlaget Politiske Studier).

(1994), 'After the Fourth Debate – Patterns of International Relations Theory in the 1990s', manuscript.

(forthcoming a), 'Transformation and Institutionalization: With Ruggie across IR Paradigms', in Iver B. Neumann and Ole Wæver (eds.), *The Future of International Relations: Masters in the Making?* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul).

(forthcoming b), 'Europe's Three Empires: A Watsonian Interpretation of Post-wall European Security', forthcoming in Fawn, Larkins and Newman (eds.), *International Society After the Cold War* (Millennium and Macmillan).

Wæver, Ole, Holm, Ulla and Larsen, Henrik (forthcoming), *The Struggle for 'Europe': French and German Concepts of State, Nation and European Union.*

Wilde, Jaap de (1991), *Saved From Oblivion: Interdependence Theory in the First Half of the 20th Century. A Study on the Causality Between War and Complex Interdependence* (Dartmouth: Aldershot).